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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1990, Donna Jean Harris, an African-American
woman, boarded American Airlines Flight 1289 for a flight from Dallas,
Texas to Portland, Oregon.' She had purchased a first class ticket and
was assigned to seat 4E.2 Little did she know that her experiences on
the subsequent flight would be anything but first class.
Subsequent to the boarding of the aircraft, but prior to the plane's
departure from Dallas, Texas, John Doe, a caucasian male seated
directly in front of Ms. Harris, 3 ordered and consumed four alcoholic
beverages.' Shortly after takeoff, John Doe uttered a number of racially
denigrating remarks.' As a result his actions and comments during the
1. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition,
Ms. Harris was the only African-American passenger on the plane. See id.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17156, 17157 (D. Or. Mar.
27, 1992).
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flight, Mr. Doe humiliated, intimidated, and frightened Ms. Harris to the
extent that she became visibly shaken and began to cry.6
In response to John Doe's remarks, an American Airlines flight
attendant attempted to alleviate the situation by refusing to serve addi-
tional alcoholic beverages to Mr. Doe.7 However, the flight attendant's
actions were to no avail.8 Rather than follow the American Airlines
procedures that the flight attendants are taught during their training, 9 the
flight attendant allowed Mr. Doe to continue to obtain drinks from the
galley.10
As a result of her experiences on the flight, Ms. Harris brought suit
in Oregon state court against American Airlines and John Doe." Ms.
Harris alleged that American Airlines violated Oregon's Public Accom-
modation Act; 2 and that American Airlines and Mr. Doe were liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.' 3 Subse-
quently, American Airlines removed the case to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. 4
Following removal, American Airlines filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted
Harris' state tort claims; 5 the Oregon Public Accommodations Act was
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d at 1473. After the flight attendant informed
John Doe that she would not serve him any more alcoholic beverages, Mr. Doe went to the galley
and returned with a drink. See id. Although it is uncertain whether the additional drinks were
alcoholic in nature, the flight attendant did not inform Ms. Harris of this fact, and thus failed to
provide Ms. Harris with information which likely would have reduced her level of anxiety. See
Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) at 17159.
9. See Harris, 55 F.3d at 1476. According to the flight attendant's deposition, once a
passenger appears to be intoxicated, "the employee is to (1) inform the passenger that they are
disturbing others and (2) ask them to settle down." Id. Additionally, once passenger misconduct
occurs, the flight attendant should attempt to deal with the passenger and then, if necessary, notify
the captain who will, if necessary, take action ranging from speaking with the passenger to making
an unscheduled stop and having the passenger removed from the aircraft. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 1473. John Doe never became a real party to the suit because his real identity
could not be established due to American Airlines' procedure of destroying the passenger manifest
forty-eight to seventy-two hours after a scheduled flight deplanes. See id. at 1473 n. 1.
12. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.670 - 30.685 (1995). § 30.670 states: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, without any distinction,
discrimination or restriction on account of race, religion, sex, marital status, color or national
origin." Id.
13. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d at 1473.
14. See id.
15. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301-1557 (1988), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 745 (1994) and recodified in various sections of 49 U.S.C. (1994). The ADA was enacted in
1978 as an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA), and was intended to
"encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market
[Vol. 51:955
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not violated;16 American Airlines' acts were not sufficient to cause Har-
ris severe emotional distress; 17 and that Harris' negligence claim was
barred because her injuries were purely emotional with no economic
loss.' 8 The district court, adopting the findings and recommendations of
the federal magistrate, 19 granted American Airlines' motion for sum-
mary judgment. Although the court concluded that the ADA did not
preempt Harris' state tort claims,2" it ruled that (1) American Airlines'
actions did not constitute a violation of the Oregon Public Accommoda-
tions Act;2  (2) American Airlines' actions were not sufficient to consti-
tute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress;22 and (3)
Harris could not recover on a claim of negligence because she lacked an
economic loss. 2 3  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the granting of summary judgment, but on different grounds.24
Without reaching the merits of the state law claims, the court held that
the conduct of an air carrier's flight crew constitutes "service" within the
ADA and therefore, any state tort and public accommodations claims
that arise out of such service are preempted.25 It is the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the ADA that is the focus of this Note.
Harris created more questions than it answered. Unfortunately for
plaintiffs, the effect of the decision could make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring actions against the airlines. 26  This result occurs
because the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately interpret, apply, and clar-
ify established ADA jurisprudence. Instead, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted "services" broadly, having the effect of making the scope of the
ADA less clear by causing a split among the circuits. 27
forces." Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705 (1978) (codified as
amended in 49 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994).
16. See Harris, 55 F.3d at 1476.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 24 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17156, 17157 (D. Or. Mar.
27, 1992).
20. See id. at 17158.
21. See id. at 17159.
22. See id. at 17160.
23. See id.
24. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1995).
25. See id. at 1477.
26. Id.
27. See Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding contract claim was not preempted by ADA, but punitive damages claim was
preempted); Stagl v. Delta Airlines,Inc., 52 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that ADA did not
preempt negligence claim); Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(holding that state law claim for personal injuries based on airline's negligence was not preempted
by ADA); Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (rejecting
view that ADA does not preempt state law claims for negligent rendition of services); Sedigh v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (rejecting broad preemption in state
19971
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Harris may also foreshadow the Ninth Circuit's willingness to fur-
ther expand the federal preemption clause of the ADA. 28 However, as
this Note demonstrates, such a broad interpretation of the scope of the
ADA's preemption clause29 is inconsistent with both Congress' intent 30
and with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADA
and federal preemption. 31 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion renders the ADA's savings clause meaningless.32 However inter-
preted, the significance of the decision rests on the extent to which the
airlines will use it as a shield to protect themselves from liability in
future suits.
33
common law claim not relating to airline competition); Kay v. USAir, Inc., No. 93-4856, 1994
WL 406548 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1994) (holding that "traditional state law claims for negligence" are
not preempted by ADA); O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1993)
(holding that state law action for personal injuries resulting from airlines' alleged negligence is
not preempted by ADA); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(holding that because the ADA does not provide for private remedies for injured passengers, the
ADA does not preempt common law negligence claim); see also Manning v. Skywest Airlines,
Inc., No. CV 95-4567-WMB, 1996 WL 407847, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 16, 1996) (recognizing that
Harris is contrary to the weight of authority interpreting the ADA preemption, but nonetheless,
this court is bound by the decision); Von Hundertmark v. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc.,
No. CV-93-1369 (CPS), 1996 WL 118538, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996) (recognizing that
Harris' expansive reading of the meaning of "service" has not been adopted in other
jurisdictions); Romano v. American Trans Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1637, 1641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing that Harris is wrongly decided).
28. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995).
29. See infra notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
30. See id.
31. See American Airlines v, Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995); Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). There are three primary types of preemption: express,
conflict, and field preemption. Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly declares a
certain area of law to be governed by federal law. The supremacy clause establishes conflict
preemption; state law will be preempted when it conflicts with federal law. In contrast, field
preemption is established when "the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to
make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation."
Hillsborough v. Automated Medical Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). However, when Congress acts to preempt areas
traditionally occupied by the States, it must manifest its intent clearly. See English v. General
Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
32. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)
(replaced in substance by 49 U.S.C. section 40120(c)). The savings clause states "[n]othing
contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." Id. This
clause was originally developed prior to the ADA. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798 (1958); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1106, 52 Stat.
973, 1027 (1938). The importance of the savings clause cannot be understated, for it, coupled
with § 1371(q), can only be interpreted to limit the scope of services thereby limiting the reach of
preemption with respect to state law. Otherwise, a complete preemption of state law would render
the savings clause and the requirements of § 137 1(q) completely nugatory. For a discussion of the
requirements of § 1371(q) see infra note 138 and accompanying text.
33. Since the Harris decision, at least nine parties have attempted to rely on Harris to support
their argument that the ADA preempted the claims alleged in their suit. See Meinhold v. Trans
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II. PERSPECTIVE
A. Statutory History
1. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938
Although federal legislation of aviation originally developed along
two tracks with the Air Mail Act of 1925 (Kelley Bill)34 and the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, 3s the first major economic regulations evolved
from the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA). 36 The CAA created two
separate agencies, the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Civil
Aeronautics Authority,37 later changed to the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) in 1940.38 The Civil Aeronautics Administration was responsi-
ble for promoting the development, safety, and regulation of civil aero-
nautics, 39 while the Civil Aeronautics Board was responsible for the
economic regulation of civilian aviation.40
Section 1106 of the CAA provides the most significant section of
the Act with respect to current issues of preemption. Section 1106, the
savings clause,41 provides the basis for which a state common law claim
may survive federal preemption. The clause states: "[n]othing contained
in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition
to such remedies. 4 2  The CAA continued until the 1950's when
problems arose as to who controlled the air space, the military system or
World Airlines, Inc., No. CV 96-6077 DDP (VAPX), 1996 WL 731899 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996);
Vieira v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C-95-04697, 1996 WL 478686 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
1996); Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Manning v.
Skywest Airlines, No. CV 95-4567-WMB, 1996 WL 407847 (C.D. Cal. 1996 Jun. 16, 1996); Von
Hundertmark v. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc., No. CV-93-1369 (CPS), 1996 WL
118538 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996); Stone v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw.
1995); Gee v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. C 94-03983 CW, 1995 WL 652463 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31,
1995); Costa v. American Airlines, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Romano v. American
Trans Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1637 (Cal. 2d Ct. App. 1996).
34. 43 Stat. 805 (1925). For a discussion on the history of the Air Mail Act see CHARLES S.
RHYNE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED WITH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY WHICH
PRODUCED IT AND THE PRECEDENTS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED 20-24 (1939) [hereinafter RHYNE].
35. 44 Stat. 568 (1926) as amended 45 Stat. 1404 (1929), 48 Stat. 933 (1934), 49 U.S.C. 171
(1934). For a discussion of the history of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 see RHYNE, supra note
34, at 37-40.
36. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938); see also RHYNE, supra note
34, at 41-188.
37. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
38. The CAA was subsequently renamed the CAB and received its regulatory authority from
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
39. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (preamble).
40. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
41. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
42. Id.
1997]
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the civilian system. 3
2. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In 1958, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
(FAA). 4 The FAA established "a new Federal agency with powers ade-
quate to enable it to provide for the safe and efficient use of the naviga-
ble airspace by both civil and military operations."45  This Act
transferred the powers of the CAA to the Federal Aviation Agency and
included a savings clause like its predecessor in the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938.6 The Act also provided for the continuance of the CAB
which still maintained the authority to regulate interstate air fares and to
take action against certain trade practices.4 7 This regulation went sub-
stantially unchanged until the mid-1970's when Congress recognized the
need to make regulatory changes to the airlines.4 8
3. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
In 1978, Congress, following a request from President Carter,4 9
responded to the need to modernize the regulatory scheme of the airline
industry by passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA). 5 0 In
the ADA, Congress abandoned previously restrictive regulations in
favor of deregulation." It did so with the intention of increasing compe-
tition among the airlines.52 The airlines were to benefit by a "maximum
reliance on competitive market forces," resulting in an efficient and
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (later codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-
1557 (1988)).
45. H.R. Rep. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741.
46. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)
(replaced in substance by 49 U.S.C. section 40120(c)). The clause states: "[n]othing contained in
this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." Id.
47. See Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 201, 72 Stat. 741 (1958) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
1506 (1988)).
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3737.
49. See Reduced Federal Regulation of the Domestic Commercial Airline Industry," Message
from Pres. Carter to the Congress, March 4, 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 285 (1977).
The message urged Congress "to enact, without delay, regulatory reform of domestic commercial
aviation." Id. See also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1981).
50. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat.
745 (1994) and recodified in various sections of 49 U.S.C. (1994).
51. See id.
52. See id. This helps establish that the primary goal of deregulation was to compel the
airlines to compete in a free market absent conflicting state regulations such that consumers would
receive the most benefit.
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innovative airline industry. 3
Although the ADA, like its predecessors,54 contained a savings
clause which was incorporated without any changes," it also added a
federal preemption clause. 56 This clause stated:
[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this section, no State or polit-
ical subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other political
agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of
law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having
authority under title IV of this Act to provide air transportation. 7
Through the preemption clause, Congress intended to prevent states
from creating varying regulations and laws which would have a deleteri-
ous effect on federal deregulation. 8 This preemption clause, coupled
with the continued inclusion of the savings clause,5 9 has been the source
of controversy in numerous suits involving the airlines.60
53. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
54. See 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
55. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)
(replaced in substance by 49 U.S.C. section 40120(c)).
56. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988), repealed by Pub.L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379 (1994).
57. Id.
58. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). There is evidence
that the ADA was intended to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations" resulting from the
federal government's reduced role in the regulation of the airlines. H.R. Rep. No. 95-12611, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3752.
59. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)
(replaced in substance by 49 U.S.C. section 40120(c)).
60. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995); West v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 505 U.S. 1201 (1992); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992);
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Travel All Over The World, Inc. v. The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996); Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55
F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995); Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 1995); Hodges v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc.,
44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773 (5th
Cir. 1990); Dykens v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1989); O'Carroll v.
American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1989); Air Transport Assoc. v. Pub. Utilities
Comm'n, 833 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1987); Western Airlines, Inc. v. Port Auth. N.Y. and N.J., 817
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987); Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984);
Meinhold v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. CV 96-6077 DDP (VAPX), 1996 WL 731899 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 6, 1996); Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. II1. 1996);
Vieira v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C-95-04697 CAL ARB (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996);
Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Trinidad v. American
Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Manning v. Skywest Airlines, No. CV 95-4567-
WMB, 1996 WL 407847 (C.D. Cal. Jun, 16, 1996); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 927 F.
Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Von Hundertmark v. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, No. CV-93-
1369 (CPS), 1996 WL 118538 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996); Torraco v. American Airlines, Inc., No.
94 C 1852, 1996 WL 6560 (N.D. I11. Jan. 4, 1996); Stone v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 905 F.
Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1955); Gee v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. C 94-03983 CW, 1995 WL
652463 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1995); Moore v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Tex.
19971
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4. THE SUNSET PROVISIONS OF 1984
In addition to changing the regulatory scheme of the airline indus-
try, the ADA also eliminated the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).6"
Congress achieved this by enacting the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
Act of 1984 (Sunset Provisions).62 Although the Sunset Provisions
transferred the CAB's authority to the Department of Transportation, 63 it
did not change either the savings clause or the preemption clause con-
tained in the ADA.
B. Relevant Case Law
1. SHA W V. DELTA AIRLINES, /NC.
6 4
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the scope of
the preemption clause of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).65 The Court, relying on both the plain
language of the statute66 and its legislative history,67 held that the phrase
"relating to" should be broadly interpreted to mean a law that "has a
connection or reference to" an employee benefit plan. 68
Paradoxically, although the Court interpreted the scope of the pre-
1995); Costa v. American Airlines, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Christoph v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-1148, 1995 WL 422147 (E.D. La. July 17, 1995);
Rodriguez v. American Airlines, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 967 (D.P.R. 1995); Sedigh v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 850 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Kay v. USAir, Inc., No. 93-4856, 1994 WL 406548 (E.D.
Pa. July 28, 1994); Curley v. American Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Doricent
V. American Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670 (D. Mass. Oct. 19, 1993);
O'Hern v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. III. 1993); Margolis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274
(Tex. 1996); Knopp v. American Airlines, Inc., 1996 WL 676701 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 1996);
Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v. Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., No. 95CA0307, 1996
WL 714501 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1996); Romano v. American Trans Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th
1637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 54 (I11. App. Ct.
1996); Vine v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. CV 950375030S, 1996 WL 168049 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 4, 1996).
61. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (1988). The Civil Aeronautics Board "shall cease to be in
effect on December 31, 1981." Id.
62. See Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984).
63. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(b) (1988).
64. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
65. Id. at 96-97.
66. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976). The
clause preempts any state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan." Id. at § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
67. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S., at 98-100. Given that the statute was
ambiguous enough to warrant an examination of its legislative history, it is logical to conclude
that the legislative history of the ADA also should be examined with respect to the same
ambiguous statements found in the ERISA statute.
68. Id. at 96-97.
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emption clause broadly, 69 it reduced the potential all-encompassing
application of the clause by establishing certain circumstances in which
a state law would not be preempted even though the law "related to" an
employee benefit." This decision proved significant because the rele-
vant language of ERISA's and the ADA's preemption clauses are identi-
cal, and the Court eventually adopted the ERISA standard in interpreting
the scope of the ADA's preemption clause."
2. WEST V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.7 2
On September 3, 1986, William D. West, wanting to travel from
Great Falls, Montana to Arlington, Virginia on October 7, 1986,
purchased a non-refundable, non-changeable ticket from Northwest Air-
lines. 3 However, prior to the date of West's departure, Northwest,
without notifying either West or any of the Northwest Airlines sales
agents, changed the type of aircraft for West's flight from a Boeing 727,
which has a capacity of 146 passengers, to a DC-9, which has a capacity
of 78 passengers.74
As a result, West, upon attempting to check-in at the gate, was
informed that the flight was overbooked and that his confirmed seat had
been given away.75 Northwest's attempts to alleviate the situation were
unsuccessful,76 forcing West to reschedule his trip for "approximately
two weeks later." 77
Dissatisfied with Northwest's actions, West filed a two-count com-
plaint in Montana state court, seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.78 West alleged that Northwest's actions constituted a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and was a violation of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act (FAA) for unjust discrimination.79
Northwest removed the case to the U.S. District Court and subse-
69. See id.
70. See id. at 100 n.21 (1983). The Court stated that "[s]ome state actions may affect
employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the
law 'relates to' the plan." Id.
71. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
72. 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. See id. at 658.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Northwest attempted to make room for West and others by asking for volunteers to give
up their seats in return for consideration. However, only three people volunteered and West was
still left without a seat on the flight. Northwest also attempted to place West on a later flight but
he declined because it did not have the same final destination and would arrive late at night. See
id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 658-59.
79. See id.
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quently filed a motion for summary judgment.80 Northwest contended
that West's unjust discrimination claim was barred by the statute of limi-
tations and his state breach of covenant claim was preempted by the
FAA.8 ' The district court agreed and granted Northwest's motion for
summary judgment on both grounds.8 2 West subsequently appealed the
dismissal of his state law claim.8 3
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue of whether West's claim was
preempted either expressly, impliedly, or due to a conflict with federal
law. 84 The court concluded that the process of boarding passengers falls
within the scope of "services" as contained within the ADA. 5 How-
ever, the court interpreted the scope of the ADA narrowly, holding that
West's state law claim was not preempted entirely because it merely had
"an effect on airline services. 86 As a result, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's conclusion that West's claim for punitive damages
was preempted but reversed and remanded the district court's conclusion
regarding West's state law claim for compensatory damages.8 7
Although the court limited its holding to West's claim for compen-
satory damages, the decision was significant because it demonstrated
that the federal courts were attempting to narrow the scope of the ADA's
preemption clause following Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc."8 However,
this attempt to narrow the scope of the ADA's preemption clause was
short-lived due to Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.8 9
3. MORALES V. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
While the federal courts were attempting to narrow the scope of the
80. See id. at 659.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 659-61.
85. See id. at 660.
86. Id. at 660-61. The court stated that to conclude that the ADA preempted West's state law
claims "would unduly expand preemption and ignore our presumption against federal preemption
in this traditional state law area." Id. at 660. This conclusion was based on previous Ninth Circuit
precedent.
87. See id. at 661.
88. See Air Transport Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm., 833 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that the preemption clause was narrow and that in order for a state law to be preempted, the law
must not only affect airlines but also be directly related to their services); Hingson v. Pacific
Southwest Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) (defining services to include seating of
passengers); New York v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(concluding that the preemption clause was so broad that it could become all-encompassing).
89. 504 U.S. 374 (1992). Morales resulted in the West decision being vacated. See West v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 505 U.S. 1201 (1992). On remand, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
West's claims were preempted. See West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.
1993).
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interpretation of the ADA's preemption clause, Justice Scalia, in 1992,
reversed the trend by writing the majority opinion in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.9"
In Morales, the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) promulgated a set of guidelines, based on state consumer pro-
tection statutes, that states could use to sue the airlines for the allegedly
deceptive advertising techniques used in the advertising of air fares and
frequent flyer programs. 9' Seven attorney generals sent a memorandum
to the major airlines establishing an intent to sue based on the guidelines
and state consumer protection statutes. 92 In response, the airlines filed
suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction.93
The district court, finding that the ADA preempted the guidelines,
ruled in favor of the airlines and issued a preliminary injunction.94 Sub-
sequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.95 The Fifth Circuit also affirmed
the district court's subsequent order permanently enjoining the states
from taking action under the guidelines and state consumer protection
statutes.96 Soon thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 97 The Court thus was called upon to decide whether the ADA
preempts the states from "prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare
advertisements through enforcement of their general consumer protec-
tion statutes." 98
The Court, relied on the plain language of the ADA99 as well as
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.'00 The Court articulated a broad standard to
be used in determining whether enforcement of the NAAG guidelines
through the state consumer protection statutes would be preempted by
the ADA.'' Similar to Shaw, the analysis consisted of determining
whether state actions have a connection with, or reference to, airline
rates, routes, or services. 112 Thus, the Court adopted a broad interpreta-
90. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
91. Id. at 379.
92. See id. The states represented by the seven attorney generals are: Colorado, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 380.
93. See id.
94. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 101-02 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
95. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1990).
96. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 949 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 502 U.S. 976 (1991).
98. See id. at 378.
99. See id. at 383.
100. 463 U.S. 85 (1983); see also supra notes 64-71.
101. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 384 (1995). The Court, utilizing Black's Law Dictionary's
definition of "relating to," concluded that the ADA's definition of the phrase would require state
action to be preempted anytime the action had some relation, bearing, or concern with, rates,
routes, or services of the airlines. See id. at 383.
102. See id. at 384.
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tion of the scope of the ADA's "relating to" phrase.10 3
Applying this broad interpretation, the Court held that the NAAG
guidelines were preempted by the ADA because the guidelines would
compel or restrict price advertising and therefore related to airline
prices.' The Court did, however, limit the holding in subsequent
dicta. °5 The Court stated that not all state actions that relate to rates,
routes or services are preempted, t° emphasizing that some actions have
too tenuous an effect on rates, routes, or services to conclude that they
are preempted. 07 Additionally, Justice Scalia concluded, however, that
the guidelines should be preempted by the ADA because they had a
"significant impact" on "the airlines' ability to market their product."'' 0 8
Thus, although articulating a potential broad preemption standard, the
Court's language evidences an intent to lessen its scope. This intent was
further established in the Court's subsequent decision interpreting the
ADA. 109
4. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. V. WOLENS 1 10
In 1994, the Court revisited the ADA's preemption clause."' The
plaintiffs in Wolens were participants in American Airlines' frequent
flyer program." 2 American Airlines changed the terms of the program
which reduced the use and value of the plaintiffs' accrued frequent flyer
mileage."t 3 In response, the plaintiffs, seeking an injunction," 4 brought
suit based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Prac-
tices Act.'15
103. See id. at 383-84.
104. See id. at 390.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 390-91.
107. See id. at 390. Additionally, Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, argued that a broad
interpretation of the majority's decision would be inconsistent with Congress' intent as established
by the ADA's "language, structure, and history." See id. at 419. He further contested the
soundness of adopting the ERISA standard interpreting the "relating to" phrase. See id. Although
Justice Stevens did not elaborate on an alternative analogy that the Court could have turned to,
there are other areas relating to the aviation industry that require federal preemption. See, e.g.,
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-85, 187-88 (1994).
108. Id. at 390 (emphasis added). For more commentary on the Morales decision, see Laynie
Giles, Note, Interpreting the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Federal Preemption Over State
Deceptive Advertising Laws, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 87 (1994); Eric W. Maclure, Note, Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption Provision Clips States' Wings on Regulation of Air Fare
Advertising, 71 N.C. L. REv. 905 (1993).
109. See American Airlines, Inc. v, Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 822.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505 (1992).
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Although the Court in Wolens held that the ADA preempted claims
based on the Illinois consumer statute,1 16 the Court nevertheless estab-
lished a narrower interpretation of the scope of the ADA preemption
clause.1 1 7  Specifically, the Court suggested that private tort actions
based on common law negligence and contract claims that the airline
voluntarily entered into would not be preempted. 1 8 The Court reached
these conclusions by reading the ADA's preemption clause and the
FAA's savings clause together.1 9 Thus, Wolens reinforces a more lim-
ited interpretation of the ADA's preemption clause.
III. ANALYSIS
Harris v. American Airlines, Inc. represents a departure from estab-
lished ADA preemption principles. This departure increases the uncer-
tainty pertaining to preemption under the ADA.2 There are three
primary reasons for this result. First, the Ninth Circuit failed to ade-
quately address Congress' intent. Second, the court misconstrued and
misapplied existing precedent, thereby ignoring the principle of stare
decisis.12' Finally, the court ignored the textual implications of its
decision.
In determining whether a state claim will be preempted by a federal
statute, courts must first ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the stat-
ute, especially if the language is ambiguous as it is here.'22 Although
such analysis must include a consideration of the plain meaning of the
116. 115 S. Ct. 817, 823 (1995).
117. Id. at 824. The Court emphasized that the ADA's preemption clause should not be read
"to shelter airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking
recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings." Id.
118. See id. at 824-25.
119. See id. at 826. The Court stated that "[t]he ADA's preemption clause, § 1305(a)(1), read
together with the FAA's saving clause, stops States from imposing their own substantive
standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but not from affording relief to a party who
claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated." Id. For
discussions regarding the Wolens decision, see John T. Delacourt, Federal Preemption of State
Consumer Fraud Regulations: American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995), 18
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 903 (1995); Sue Haverkos, Crash and Bum-The Airlines' Preemption
Defense Goes Down in Flames, 64 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1141 (1996).
120. The decision conflicts with the Fifth and Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the scope of
the ADA's preemption clause thereby causing a split among the circuits. See Travel All Over The
World, Inc. v. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996); Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc., 44
F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). In addition to causing this split among the circuits, the
decision, in large part, has either created confusion or has not been followed in other jurisdictions.
See supra note 27.
121. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
122. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985) (citing Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
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ADA's text, the words should not be examined alone. Instead, the text
should be read within the context of "the purposes of the pre-emption
provision, and the regulatory focus of [the statute] as a whole."'' 23 Addi-
tionally, the analysis must be approached with a presumption that "the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a]
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."' 24 Therefore, Congress' intent, as revealed by the legislative his-
tory of the ADA, is significant in determining the scope of the ADA's
preemption clause. This is especially true given that the Supreme Court
previously has interpreted "relating to" to be sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant such analysis.'25
The scope of the ADA's preemption clause should first begin with
an analysis of Congress' intent behind the "relating to" phrase with
respect to "rates, routes, or services." Such an examination of the rele-
vant House and Senate bills reveals that the preemption clause should be
interpreted narrowly. 126
For example, in the House bill, the "relating to" phrase was
described in narrow terms.' 27 The House Report established this intent
by stating that the phrase "provid[ed] that when a carrier operates under
authority granted pursuant to title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, no
State may regulate that carrier's routes, rates or services."' 128 In contrast,
the Senate bill did not contain the "relating to" phrase.' 29 Instead, it
stated "[n]o State shall enact any law, establish any standard determin-
ing routes, schedules, or rates, fares, or charges in tariffs of, or otherwise
promulgate economic regulations for any carrier."' 131 It was the nar-
rower House bill that was eventually adopted.' Thus, the legislative
history focused on the effects of economic regulations and established
an intent that the ADA should only preempt state laws that had the effect
of regulating or significantly impacting rates, routes, or services. There-
fore, in analyzing the facts in Harris, the Ninth Circuit should have con-
123. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987).
124. Doricent v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670 (D. Mass. Oct. 19,
1993) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
125. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); see also supra notes 65-71 and
accompanying text.
126. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1211, at 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3751-52;
S. Rep. No. 95-63 1, at 39 (1978).
127. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1211, at 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3751-52.
128. Id. at 16, reprinted in, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3752.
129. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 425 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
130. S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 423(a)(1) (1978), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 95-631, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978). The report further stated that the section "prohibits States from
exercising economic regulatory control over interstate airlines." Id. at 98.
131. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., at 94-95 (1978).
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sidered this intent of preempting only those state actions having a
significant impact on rates, routes, or services.
Although the Harris court seemingly embraced recent ADA pre-
emption precedents, the court only facially relied upon that precedent in
rendering its decision. The court recognized that Morales established
the standard to be used in interpreting the scope of the "relating to"
phrase. t 32  However, although the court also recognized that some
actions will affect services in too tenuous a manner and will therefore
not be preempted, 3 3 the court failed to consider this limitation in its
analysis.
While American Airlines' actions arguably revolved around serv-
ices within the scope of the ADA, 134 "Morales does not compel a con-
clusion that the state claims of intentional torts" relate to services. 135
132. See Harris v. American Airlines, 55 F.3d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995).
133. See id.
134. The CAB has stated that services include the "quid pro quo for passenger's [sic] fare,
including flight frequency and timing, liability of limits, reservation and boarding practices,
insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, [and bonding and corporate financing]."
44 Fed.Reg. 9948, 9951 (Feb. 15, 1979). Thus, the CAB was concerned with economic
deregulation and not with preempting existing state tort law.
135. Doricent v. American Airlines, No. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670, at *5 (D. Mass. Oct.
19, 1993). The scope of services should not be interpreted broadly enough to immunize airlines
from liability resulting from their own negligence. Several courts since Harris have recognized
that Congress did not intend for this result. See Meinhold v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. CV
96-6077 DDP (VAPX), 1996 WL 731899, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) (holding that the ADA
was not intended to preempt personal injury claims sounding in state tort law); Chrissafis v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (N.D. I11. 1996) (finding that false arrest and
false imprisonment claims were not related to "services" within the meaning of the ADA, and thus
not preempted); Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 897, 902 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(holding personal injury claim not preempted); Manning v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., No. CV 95-
4567-WMB, 1996 WL 407847, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1996) (concluding that negligent
operations of aircraft are not related to "services" and thus are not preempted); Trinidad v.
American Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding personal injury lawsuits
based on traditional elements of tort law are not preempted); Von Hundertmark v. Boston
Professional Hockey Assoc., Inc., No. CV-93-1369 (CPS), 1996 WL 118538, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 1996) (recognizing that Harris' expansive reading of the meaning of "service" has not
been adopted in other jurisdictions); Torraco v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 94 C 1852, 1996 WL
6560, at *5 (N.D. I11. Jan. 4, 1996) (holding state common law negligence claims are not
preempted); Knopp v. American Airlines, Inc., 1996 WL 676701, at *6-7 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 1996)
(holding that contract and negligence claims are not preempted); Continental Airlines, Inc., v.
Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274, 284 (Tex. 1996) (concluding that claims for simple negligence are not
preempted); Romano v. American Trans Air, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1637, 1646 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996)
(concluding that negligence and other torts which do not intrude upon or affect the Department of
Transportation's or the airline's self regulation of rates, routes, or services are not preempted);
Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Il1. App. Dist. 1996) (concluding that
breach of contract claims are not preempted); but cf. Arapahoe County Public Airport Auth. v.
Centennial Express Airlines, Inc., No. 95CA0307, 1996 WL 714501, at *6 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec.
12, 1996) (holding that regulation restricting scheduled passenger traffic relates to "services" and
therefore is preempted); Vieira v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C-95-04697 CAL ARB, 1996
WL 478686, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (holding that claims for negligence, conversion, and
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The Ninth Circuit should have focused on the gravamen of the com-
plaint and specifically analyzed whether the flight crew's negligence in
failing to provide for Ms. Harris' safety by not protecting her from
Doe's abusive behavior would have a significant impact on airline rates,
routes, or services.' 36 Given American Airlines has procedures for han-
dling abusive passengers, 137 and the fact that the airlines are required to
maintain insurance that covers "amounts for which ... air carriers may
become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of any person, or for
loss of or damage to property of others"'' 38 it is evident, therefore, that
Ms. Harris' claims would not have a significant impact on rates, routes,
or services. After all, but for the flight crew's abandonment of their
standard procedures, the incident would not have occurred. If airlines
follow their procedures, similar instances are less likely to occur and,
with the requirement of insurance, such incidents that do occur would
have a negligible impact on rates, routes, or services. This conclusion is
consistent with the Morales decision.' 39 In any event, the Harris court's
breach of contract for allegedly losing the items shipped are preempted); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that airline's former
employees' claims of age discrimination based on state law are preempted); Vine v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., No. CV 950375030S, 1996 WL 168049, at *3, *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996)
(concluding that state unfair trade practice and consumer fraud claims are preempted).
"Congress did not intend services to be interpreted so broadly as to encompass matters of
airplane safety or to exclude state common law personal injury claims." Torraco, at *2-3. The
court concluded that the "word 'services,"' as employed in [the ADA], must be interpreted more
narrowly to refer only to the distinctive services airlines provide to the public that significantly
relate to their ability to compete against other carriers." Torraco, at *4. However, California
district courts, some recognizing the inconsistency with Congressional intent, continue to follow
Harris because they are bound by the Ninth Circuit's decisions. See Manning v. Skywest
Airlines, Inc., No. CV 95-4567-WMB, 1996 WL 407847 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 1996); Gee v.
Southwest Airlines Co., No. C 94-03983, 1995 WL 652463 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 31, 1995); Costa v.
American Airlines, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 237 (D. Cal. 1995).
136. The court should have applied Morales and Wolens, thus recognizing that for a claim to
be preempted by the ADA, the following elements must be met: "(1) the claim must derive from
the enactment or enforcement of state law, and (2) the claim must relate to airline rates, routes, or
services, either by expressly referring to them or by having a significant economic effect on
them," Chrissafis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
137. See supra note 9.
138. 49 U.S.C. app. 1371(q) (1988). This further establishes Congress' intent that the ADA
not preempt all state tort claims. The 1994 amendments to the ADA did not change this result.
See 49 U.S.C. section 41112 (1994).
139. The preemption clause was included in the ADA to "ensure that the States would not
undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). As a result, state common law claims which do not threaten to "undo
federal regulation," thereby having a significant impact on federal regulation, should not be found
to sufficiently relate to rates, routes, or services in order to warrant preemption. Id. at 378. In
fact, several courts have already adopted this "significant impact approach." See Hodges v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1993) (state tort claims did not have a significant impact
on services); Doricent v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670, *5-7 (D.
Mass. Oct. 19, 1993) (intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of civil rights do
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decision is flawed because it failed to establish that imposing liability
would in any way significantly impact rates, routes, or services.1 40
Although the court's analysis failed to apply the Morales standard
to the Harris facts, the court's misapplication of precedent did not stop
there. As Judge Norris recognized, 4' the majority's reliance on Wolens
is misplaced. As previously discussed, 42 the Wolens Court indicated
that the ADA is not intended to preempt either breach of contract claims
that the airlines enter into on its own accord, 43 or for personal injury
claims against the airlines. 44 The court, therefore, should have ana-
lyzed Ms. Harris' claims in accordance with this limitation on
preemption.
Applying Morales and Wolens, together with the Fifth Circuit's
analysis in Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc., 45 the court should have
determined that the effects of Ms. Harris' claims would not require pre-
emption. 46  Such application reveals that the gravamen of Ms. Harris'
complaint was for negligence "based upon the flight crew's failure to
protect her from Doe's abusive behavior and for exacerbating the known
risk of emotional and physical injury" by continuing to serve Doe drinks
following the initial incident.' 47  The Morales Court established, by
declining to fashion a bright-line rule, that courts must make a factual
determination as to whether the claims are too tenuously connected to
rates, routes, or services or whether the claims threaten to undo federal
regulation. Given that the goal of the ADA is economic deregulation,1 48
not significantly impact services such that preemption would be warranted); see also cases cited
supra note 27.
140. The court could have achieved the same result if it had adjudicated the case on the merits.
This only would have required the court to affirm the district court's decision and, therefore, it
would not have created a conflict among the circuits.
141. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
142. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text.
143. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824 (1995).
144. Id. at 825 n.7; see also id. at 827 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor stated that, in her opinion, "private tort actions based on common-law
negligence or fraud, or on a statutory prohibition against fraud, are not preempted, and that her
view of Morales "does not mean that personal injury claims against airlines are always
preempted." Id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
145. 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995).
146. In Smith, the Fifth Circuit, "[n]oting that economic deregulation was the key to the ADA,"
held that boarding "services" were limited to economic decisions concerning boarding. As a
result, the court concluded that if liability was imposed, it could remotely affect ticket prices but
"it would not regulate the economic or contractual aspects of boarding." Harris v. American
Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1477-78 (1995) (Norris, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. America West
Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346-47 (1995)).
147. See Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1478 (1995) (Norris, J., dissenting).
148. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
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it is logical to conclude that in Harris, only those issues which signifi-
cantly impact the economic decisions regarding the service of beverages
would be preempted.1 49 Although Ms. Harris' claim may affect the air-
lines' procedures regarding the protection of passengers if liability was
imposed, it would not result in either regulating the "economic or con-
tractual aspects of the airline's provision of beverages,' 5 0 or forcing the
state to impose its "own substantive standards with respect to rates[,]
routes, or services."' 5' As a result, the court should have concluded that
Ms. Harris' complaint was not preempted by the ADA. Instead, the
court increased the uncertainty surrounding ADA preemption issues by
creating a split among the circuits. In addition, one wonders whether a
change in facts would have resulted in a different outcome.1 52
Failing to follow the established ADA precedent was not the only
aspect of Harris that leaves the future of ADA preemption uncertain.
149. Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472, 1478 (1995) (Norris, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 826 (1995).
152. For example, would the court have rendered the same decision if there had been physical
injuries? In similar circumstances, various courts have suggested that state tort claims involving
physical injuries are not preempted. See Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir.
1995); Doricent v. American Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 91-12084Y, 1993 WL 437670 (D.Mass.
Oct. 19, 1993). In Rombom v. United Airlines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the
court stated that if the tortious conduct does not further the provision of service in a reasonable
manner, the state tort claim will continue. The court analogized a situation where a flight
attendant shoots a passenger who refuses to remain quiet during in-flight safety instructions. The
court concluded that it would be "illogical to assume that Congress intended to preempt a
subsequent tort suit where a flight or crew member performs a service in an unreasonable and
unnecessary manner." Id. at 222. Similarly, at least one court has concluded that emotional
damages resulting from an airline's negligence would not be preempted. See Smith v. America
West Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that passengers' claims that their safety
had been jeopardized by allowing a deranged hijacker to board the aircraft were not preempted
because a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would not regulate economic or contractual aspects
of boarding).
Any change in the facts with respect to the physical versus emotional injuries should not
render different results. In each case, state tort claims should not be preempted as long as they do
not attempt to regulate rates, routes, or services. Similarly, one wonders if the court would have
concluded that the action was preempted if Harris' complaint had been based solely on state
common law. However, given that Harris' claims involved both common law and statutory
allegations, it seems logical to conclude that the Ninth Circuit would ignore the savings clause and
find both cases preempted. Additionally, it is questionable whether the Ninth Circuit would have
concluded that the action was preempted if John Doe had been an identifiable real party to the suit
and a jury had awarded Harris at least nominal damages. This would have required the appellate
court to overturn a jury verdict, which may not have been as easily accomplished. These
distinctions deprive Harris and future litigants of a legal remedy because there are few alternatives
in pursuing factually similar causes of action in federal court (assuming that the passenger could
have been identified and evidence taken, a claim for boarding or serving intoxicated passengers in
violation of 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.575(c) and (b)(1) could be brought). This further supports the
conclusion that such claims should not be preempted.
HARRIS v. AMERICAN AIRLINES
The court also added to this uncertainty by ignoring the textual implica-
tions of its decision.
The Harris decision expands the previous interpretation of the
scope of the ADA's preemption clause to the extent that all state law or
common law causes of action would be preempted. While this would
immediately reduce the number of lawsuits brought against the air-
lines, 53 it also presents difficulties in cases involving negligent airline
maintenance or pilot error. For example, if the court's interpretation of
the scope of the preemption clause were correct, then anytime a passen-
ger is injured or killed in an air crash due to the negligence of the air-
lines the passenger would not be able to recover. Similarly, anytime an
airline advertised in any media, they would not have to pay for the
advertisement because any claim for breach of contract would be pre-
empted. 54 This chain of denied claims is endless because virtually any
activity that an airline is associated with can be connected to the airlines'
rates, routes or services. In light of this relationship, numerous courts
have held that such claims are not preempted absent a significant impact
to regulation. 155 As a result, Harris' broad implication not only runs
contrary to the language and purpose of the ADA and the Supreme
Court's interpretations thereof,156 but it is also inconsistent with how the
CAB handled similar claims prior to the Sunset Provisions.'57 In addi-
tion, it suggests a complete preemption of state claims, a result which
the ADA clearly is not intended to encompass.
153. One wonders how far the airlines will be willing to exploit this decision in order to shield
themselves from liability. At a minimum, the decision will reduce the number of suits against the
airlines. See American Airlines, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, June 26, 1995, available in Westlaw,
1995 WL 6155379.
154. For a discussion of the contractual implications of federal preemption under the ADA, see
Brief for Respondents, American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995) (No. 93-1286),
reprinted in 1994 WL 381834. For another example of factual scenarios where preemption would
be illogical, see supra note 152.
155. See Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1980);
Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Air Crash Disaster
at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D. I11. 1990).
156. See American Airlines v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 826 (1995); Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
157. Section 411 in Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provided the CAB with the
power to investigate the practices of the airlines in order to protect the public. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (1988). However, it did not provide jurisdiction for private individuals to challenge
alleged wrong acts by the airlines. The CAB and its inherent powers were meant to supplement
rather than displace state laws. This is evidenced by the savings clause and by the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the savings clause. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 303
(1976) (section 411 is meant to protect the public from injuries caused by the airlines). As a
result, prior to deregulation, consumers were protected by both section 411 and the existing state
common law and statutory provisions. Since the ADA incorporated the savings clause and did not
manifest an intent to alter private remedies, it should not be interpreted to preempt state law
claims which do not regulate rates, routes, or services.
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IV. CONCLUSION
By itself, Harris is a victory for the airlines who wish to reduce the
potential liability that could be placed on their shoulders as a result of a
breach of state or common law. However, its short-term significance
rests on the impact that it will have on the other circuits and on the lower
courts which must initially resolve the ADA preemption issues in the
future. In the struggle to apply a now murky ADA preemption jurispru-
dence, 158 the courts should not adopt Harris, but turn instead to other
more sound decisions.' 59 Given that the statutory language of the ADA
manifests Congress' intent that preemption should not be so broad, as
well as the textual implications of the Harris decision, one can only
conclude that the Harris decision creates turbulence in an otherwise
clear sky.
JOHN T. HOUCHIN
158. The significance of the case is not limited even though Congress repealed § 1305(a)
because in 1994, Congress' reenactment of Title 49 revised the clause to read: "[A] State ... may
not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier .... " 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1) (1994). The intent of
Congress was that the revision would not substantively change the ADA's preemption
jurisprudence. See Pub.L. 103-272, § l(a), 108 Stat. 745; see also cases following Harris which
evidence this intent cited supra note 135. Thus, the Congressional intent remains the same and
the potential for the courts to apply preemption is still a threat to state court litigation.
159. See supra note 135.
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